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Abstract: In this paper, we present a new card-less access control system aiming to replace existing systems based on
vulnerable contact-less cards. These existing systems have many vulnerabilities which makes them not secure
enough to be deployed to protect restricted areas. We propose to deploy a new access control architecture
based on the use of a smartphone to remove the physical card. Our secure access control system is based on
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) in the cloud and Identity Based Encryption (IBE) mechanisms. The
authentication protocol deployed on our architecture is based on IBAKE. Finally, a performance evaluation of
the protocol is provided.
complex authentication algorithms avoiding the use
of a shared secret. However, smartphones can not be
considered as trusted devices. Thereby, all sensitive
operations such as key generation, key storage and en-
cryption/decryption operations need to be supported
by secure components.
In order to satisfy these security constraints, sev-
eral trusted mobile computing solutions have been
proposed (Asokan et al., 2014; Bouazzouni et al.,
2016) among which is the Trusted Execution Environ-
ment (TEE): a combination of a hardware part (pro-
cessor) and a software part (Secure Operating Sys-
tem).
A main drawback of TEE is the use of a hardware
component that is fully controlled by the manufac-
turer. Indeed, it does not allow the user to deploy
trusted application on this component in an easy way
and often requires a manufacturer agreement prior de-
ployment. However, new fully software based so-
lutions such as OP-TEE can be used to bypass this
agreement.
Section 2 presents the smart campus context in
which this works is performed. In section 3, we
present the identity-based authentication schemes that
will be used in the proposition. In section 5, we
present and discuss our solution to address access
control on a smart-campus. Then, an evaluation is
given in section 6 before concluding.
1 INTRODUCTION
Contact-less tags using Near Field Communication 
(NFC) or Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) 
technologies are used for access control for several 
years now. However, the first generation of these 
tags comes with a very small set of security mech-
anisms and the confidence they can provide is then 
limited. Indeed, the main security aspect they pro-
vide is their capacity to provide a unique identifier 
that is stored in a non-rewritable memory. But, as 
presented in (Mitrokotsa et al., 2011) these contact-
less tags can be cloned. To address these security is-
sues, the cards manufacturers developed a new gen-
eration of cards with more security capabilities. For 
instance, the MIFARE DESFIRE card supports Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algo-
rithm that allows to deploy authentication algorithms 
between the card and the reader for secure communi-
cation. However, almost all these authentication algo-
rithms are based on the shared secret paradigm, which 
means that the reader and the card are sharing a secret 
(a pool of encryption keys in some implementations) 
prior to the communication. Furthermore, some DES-
FIRE cards are sensitive to side channel attacks like 
exposed in (Oswald and Paar, 2011).
To overcome these issues, we propose a new au-
thentication scheme based on the emulation of the 
physical card on a smartphone. The smartphone stor-
age and computation capabilities allow to deploy
2 CONTEXT AND PROBLEM
STATEMENT
The work presented in this paper is a part of a global
smart campus project called neoCampus that aims at
designing a modern and green campus thanks to a va-
riety of new sensors and softwares. So far, both cam-
pus employees and students have Mifare classic 1K
NFC cards that they use to access various services.
For instance, to access a restricted area such as a lab
or a meeting room, the user has to authenticate using
a contact-less card to a reader. If he is authorized,
the system opens the door otherwise the door remains
closed.
Since these cards have vulnerabilities allowing
an attacker to clone it (see (Mitrokotsa et al., 2011;
Mitrokotsa et al., 2010), the university is now switch-
ing these cards for DESFIRE NFC cards. These cards
are more secure than the previous one and can per-
form symmetric cryptographic operations and to de-
ploy simple authentication algorithms based on the
shared secret paradigm. However, there are still two
major drawbacks: deployment costs and user authen-
tication. Indeed, when a Mifare 1K costs in average
0.02$, a DESFIRE card is three times more expen-
sive. Also, Oswalds et al. pointed in (Oswald and
Paar, 2011) that these cards are vulnerable to a low
cost side channel attack allowing the attacker to re-
cover the encryption key.
In this paper, we propose a secure access control
system for a smart campus to replace the existing one
that relies on vulnerable MIFARE cards without dis-
rupting the platform currently deployed.
3 ID-BASED SOLUTIONS
The current access control systems based on contact-
less cards are using the UUID of the card in the au-
thentication process. In order to remove the physi-
cal card and deploy a more secure access control sys-
tem using the identity, it is necessary to rely on cryp-
tographic mechanisms dealing with the identity of a
user.
The authentication protocols based on identity
mainly rely on a Public Key Infrastructure. The PKI
is an organization that can register users and provide
them a key pair composed of a private and a public
one that can be used in the authentication process. If
a user wants to get a key pair for a HTTPS connec-
tion for instance, he has to register his identity in the
PKI. He has also to provide many information about
him and his organization. At the end of the process,
he will get his key pair and will be able to execute
authentication protocols based on asymmetric cryp-
tography.
However, this process is heavy and expensive and
requires the user to give a lot of information about
him and his organization. Moreover, this system re-
lies on the use of certificates to prove the identity of
the key owner. Exchanging, storing and processing
certificates induce an overhead in the system perfor-
mances. Indeed, the number of certificates to store
grows according to the number of users. To deal
with these issues, a new mechanism was introduced
by Shamir (Shamir, 1984): The Identity Based En-
cryption (IBE) in which the identity can be viewed as
a public key in public key cryptography.
This approach is a trade-off between a straightfor-
ward process of binding an identity to an asymmetric
pair of keys and the usage of a new kind of trusted
third-party acting as a mandatory key escrow (i.e. ca-
pable of producing every pair of cryptographic keys).
The first IBE scheme fully satisfactory in terms
of security and performances has been proposed by
Boneh and Franklin (Boneh and Franklin, 2001) in
2001. Therefore, IBE schemes based on existing
cryptographic standards have emerged such as the one
proposed by Callas (Callas, 2005) that is based on
RSA.
4 TRUSTED EXECUTION
ENVIRONMENT
As the smartphones are considered untrusted, the
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) was developed
to secure the data storage and to process sensitive op-
eration such as cryptographic operations. The TEE
consists of a hardware part and a software part. The
hardware part is embedded in the processor and pro-
vides a set of secure operations. The software part is
split into two separate execution environments: REE
and TEE. The Rich Execution Environment (REE)
(a k.a Normal World) represents the standard operat-
ing system (Rich OS) of the smartphone such as An-
droid for instance. The TEE represents the Secure OS
and is responsible for performing sensitive processing
and secure Input/Output.
OP-TEE (Linaro And STMicroelectronics, 2017)
is a Linaro/STMicroelectronics project with the ob-
jective to release a totally virtualized and open source
TEE. It also can be used as a secure OS on the top
of a physical TEE. OP-TEE provides an Application
Programming Interface (API) to invoke certified cryp-
tographic operations1 in the Secure World side (TEE).
1Libtomcrypt : http://www.libtom.com/
In this paper, for our implementation, we use a JUNO
board which is a physical TEE and a virtualized TEE
using FVP which is an hypervisor running on the top
of a Debian-based OS.
5 TRUSTED ACCESS CONTROL
ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1: Trusted access control architecture based on IBE.
The use of a TEE in the cloud is based on the con-
sideration that at the time of writing, only few smart-
phones have TEE capabilities. Therefore, to provide
the TEE secure storage and secure processing capa-
bilities for any user, a cloud-based solution seems to
be the best candidate.
Indeed, several alternatives to the architecture pro-
posed in Figure 1 have been considered. First was
investigated the possibility to use TEE on the smart-
phone TEE for the end user and a private cloud-based
TEE for the reader. Even if the overall performances
are better, this solution has not been selected for the
above reasons. Second, is the possibility to rely on a
single cloud-based TEE that limits the overall com-
plexity of the architecture but with less flexibility for
the end user. Indeed, the readers secure cloud is a part
of the overall smart campus and can be viewed as a
private cloud. In order to allow the use of the pro-
posed solution in other contexts beside smart campus
it seems more relevant to have a dedicated cloud-base
TEE for end users.
5.2 Threats Identification
In the proposed architecture, every parties involved
are assumed to be honest and will not deviate from
the proposed protocol. Likewise, end-users’ smart-
phones, readers and cloud servers only exchange valid
information. Furthermore, cloud servers are assumed
to be secure and no information can be leaked from a
user to another. Cloud security is out of the scope of
this paper. Smartphones are assumed to have NFC ca-
pabilities to emulate contact-less cards. No assump-
tion are made on the communication links.
However, several threats can be identified. First is
the classical passive attacker that will eavesdrop com-
munications to discover access credentials. To avoid
this, every communication has to be cyphered and
have to provide mechanisms to avoid replay. Second
are threats targeting the smartphone of the end-user.
Indeed, these terminals are vulnerable to malwares or
trojans that can intercept sensitive information during
In this section we present the solution that we pro-
pose. We first start by presenting the general architec-
ture, we follow by exposing the threats we identified 
and our security hypothesis and finish by describing 
the authentication protocol.
5.1 General Architecture
To perform a secure access control on a smart cam-
pus, we propose the architecture presented in Figure 1 
where a user tries to access a restricted area.
This architecture is composed of a smartphone 
with NFC capabilities, a NFC reader and for each de-
vice, a remote TEE deployed in a dedicated secure 
cloud and an access control server.
The smartphone is used to initiate the authentica-
tion process by taping a NFC reader. We suppose that 
the smartphone has no TEE capabilities. It communi-
cates with a remote TEE in the cloud to perform the 
authentication process and the cryptographic opera-
tion.
The NFC reader represents a wall reader installed 
close to each door. It is a cheap device with no secure 
processing capabilities that is already present in every 
campus. It is assumed that all readers have an Ether-
net connection with an access control server thereby 
our solution does not modify the current infrastruc-
ture. The only modification to existing infrastructures 
is that now all NFC reader will communicate with a 
secure cloud to perform the authentication process.
The secure cloud consists of one or several TEE 
accessible through the Internet. This cloud re-
ceives messages from the two previous devices and 
is in charge of executing sensitive operations such 
as encryption, decryption and signatures for instance. 
From a practical standpoint, there are two separate se-
cure cloud: one for the user, one for the smart campus 
infrastructure which can be viewed as a private cloud.
The access control server is in charge of checking 
the user’s credentials in order to grant the access or 
not. It’s already a part of the existing infrastructure of 
most university campus and can be viewed as a ser-
vice offered by the private cloud of the university. No 
modifications are made on this part.
both communications and processing. Rooted termi-
nals are even weaker in terms of security as malicious
softwares can potentially have access to the overall
file system . Therefore, no sensitive operation neither
critical credentials can be performed or stored on the
smartphone. Every smartphone is considered as an
untrusted device.
In the proposed architecture, every cryptographic
operation are assumed to be realized in the secure
cloud. A secure identification between the end-user
and the secure cloud has then to be performed. In the
remaining of the paper, we will focus on the authen-
tication of the user against the access control server
and therefore consider that this cloud authentication
has already been realized. Please also note that this
cloud authentication can be performed prior to the ac-
cess control and does not have to be performed again
as long as the connectivity with the secure cloud is
active.
5.3 Protocol Description
The overall protocol is composed of an ID-Based
authentication protocol IBAKE (Cakulev and Sun-
daram, 2012), that is adapted to the cloud-based en-
vironment. In our architecture, every cryptographic
operation and every secure storage are performed in
TEEs that are hosted in the secure cloud and please
note that, as discussed previously, the user is securely
authenticated in the cloud prior to the proposed pro-
tocol.
The IBAKE protocol allows both entities (i.e. the
user and the reader) to agree on a session key that will
then be used to encrypt the subsequent exchanges.
The IBAKE protocol has been implemented in OP-
TEE based on Callas’s IBE in which the identity is
hashed so that it can be used with a regular RSA.
The overall protocol, depicted in Figure 2, is com-
posed of 8 steps as given in the following:
• 1 - Initiate the Authentication Process. When
a user wants to get access to a restricted area, he
has to tap his smartphone against the wall-reader.
• 2 - Request Challenge. When a user requests an
access to the restricted area, the reader communi-
cates with its cloud to request an encrypted chal-
lenge.
• 3-6 - IBAKE Messages.2 This part of corre-
sponds to the IBAKE key exchange protocol exe-
cution. At the end of this process, the two devices
agree on a session key x∗ y∗P. From this session
key, an AES symmetric key is derived. An AES
2Dashed lines are indirect messages.
encrypted channel communication is then set up
where every other exchanges will take place.
• 7-8 - Authenticated Access Control. The user re-
quests an access to a restricted area and sends his
credentials encrypted with the session key to the
reader which forwards them to the access control
server. Upon reception, the server uses the OP-
TEE server to decipher the message and grants or
refuses the access based on the credentials.
Smartphone’s
Cloud Smartphone Reader
Reader’s
Cloud
Access Control
Ser er
1- Initiate
authentication
2- Request
Challenge
3- IBAKE
EID(x∗P)
4- IBAKE
EID(x∗P,y∗P)
5- IBAKE
EID(y∗P) or KO
6- Session key
OK or KO
7- Request
Access
8- Access
Response
Figure 2: Chronogram of the proposed access control pro-
tocol.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this performance evaluation, we will focus on the
time taken by the cryptographic operations as it will
be the most time consuming part of the process. In-
deed, since the size of the IBAKE packet payload
does not exceed 64 bytes, the time taken by network
communications is not significant. The most time
consuming communication part is the NFC link be-
tween the smartphone and the reader (i.e.: 53 kBps)
which takes around 1ms for a single packet and can
therefore be neglected from a usability standpoint.
6.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of the cryptographic op-
eration in the secure cloud, experiments have been
made with both virtualized and hardware TEE.
The virtualized TEE consists of a virtual machine
with an Intel I7 processor with 1 GByte of dedi-
cated RAM (Random Access Memory) hosting the
OP-TEE emulated environment.
The hardware TEE consists of an ARM develop-
ment card called the ARM JUNO Board: a develop-
ment card provided by ARM to develop applications
that need to use some proprietary features that are
usually locked in smarpthones. In our case, it enables
the deployment of OP-TEE granting it access to the
TrustZone features provided by the embedded proces-
sor. From a technical standpoint, the board consists of
a complete development kit with a dual core Cortex-
A57 MPCore processors, Random Access Memory
(RAM) and input/output peripherals such as USB and
Ethernet ports. For comparison, the provided proces-
sors are the same as the one that equip the Samsung
Galaxy S6 and note 5, the LG G4 and the HTC M8.
6.2 Experimental Results
The first thing to evaluate is the time taken by the IBE
key generation process to evaluate if it’s possible to
do it online or if the key pair has to be generated and
stored prior to the authentication.
Figure 3 shows the time taken by the virtualized
and the hardware TEE to perform an IBE key pair
generation. We observe that this time grows expo-
nentially according to the key size. For instance, for
a 1024 bits key-pair, the virtualized TEE takes about
16 seconds when the hardware TEE takes 2.09 sec-
onds. The performances are 8 times better in av-
erage between the two environments. However, the
time taken by this process is not in adequacy with the
constraint of a real time authentication protocol. For
these reasons, the generation process have to be done
offline and the key pair has then to be stored in the
secure cloud.
Figure 3: RSA-based IBE key pair generation time.
Figure 4 shows the time taken by both virtual-
virtualized environment. For instance, with a random
value x = 500, the virtualized OP-TEE takes 1.1 sec-
onds where the hardware environment takes 0.59 sec-
onds.
Figure 4: IBAKE computation time.
Every IBAKE exchanged messages are ciphered
with an IBE algorithm. Figure 5 depicts the time
taken by both virtualized and hardware TEE to ci-
pher such messages with a Callas IBE. We observe
that the hardware TEE performance are times better
than the one of the virtualized one. For instance, with
1024 bits of data (128 Bytes), which is more than our
packet size, the hardware TEE takes less than 0.1 sec-
onds. It is a very acceptable performance for our pro-
tocol.
Figure 5: RSA-based IBE ciphering time.
After agreeing on a session key (x∗y∗P), the user
sends his credentials to the access control server to re-
quest the access to the restricted area. The credentials
are encrypted with AES-256 to avoid eavesdropping.
The AES key used is derived from IBAKE session
key.
Figure 6 shows the time taken by AES-256 to en-
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til the agreement on the session key. With the vir-
tualized OP-TEE, we observe that the authentication
time evolves linearly according to the random num-
bers generated. Below a value of 400, the processing
time is under 1 second. With the hardware OP-TEE, 
the performances are 2 times better comparing to the
crypt different size of messages. We observe that the
ciphering time is less than 0.14 seconds with virtu-
alized OP-TEE for 4096 bytes of data which is very
quick regarding to the overall protocol time. As ex-
pected, the hardware environment performs better as,
for the same amount of data (4096 bytes in this case),
the gain is about 10 times regarding to the virtualized
environment (less than 0.02 seconds).
Figure 6: AES ciphering time.
To conclude, the most efficient solution is to use
an hardware based TEE in the secure cloud and to
rely on symmetric algorithm for the secure exchanges
that follow the IBAKE authentication. Based on the
provided measurements, it is possible to estimate the
time taken by the whole protocol. Indeed, we have
6 ciphering operations with IBE that takes 0.05 sec-
onds (i.e. for a 64 byte packet) each giving a total
of 0.30 seconds. We have also to add the IBAKE key
agreement according to the random number choice. In
the worst case , this operation takes 0.6 seconds. Fi-
nally, the AES-256 encryption of the credential take
less than 0.01 seconds to perform which gives a total
of 0.9 seconds for the authentication process.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a secure access
control protocol based on TEE and IBE. First, we de-
scribed the current access control systems based on
contact-less cards and pointed out their vulnerabili-
ties. Then, we described identity-based authentica-
tion schemes followed by a focus on ID-Based crypto-
graphic solutions. We also exposed our solution based
on IBAKE and on the use of a cloud-based TEE to
secure the overall access control protocol and gave a
performance evaluation of the TEE in terms of time
to perform the different cryptographic operations in-
volved in the protocol. This evaluation highlights the
viability of the solution.
In future works, it is investigated to test to evalu-
ate the use of another TEE: Intel SGX to compare the
performance between this technology and our remote
TEE. A scalability evaluation of our protocol will be
performed to evaluate the impact of the number of stu-
dents on the system and a real deployment will be per-
formed in the framework of neOCampus.
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